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Many countries have a clear policy objective of increasing their share of renewable energy 
sources (RESs). However, a major impediment to higher RES penetration often lies in the 
historically grown structures of a country’s electricity sector. In Indonesia, policymakers have 
relied on cheap fossil fuels and state control to provide the population with access to both 
reliable and affordable electricity. However, this focus on only two of the three horns of the 
energy trilemma, namely energy security and energy equity (and not sustainability), may put 
Indonesia at risk of missing its ambitious RES targets. In this context, a number of small-
scale reform attempts to promote RES integration in recent years have proved to be 
relatively unsuccessful. Like many other countries, Indonesia needs clear policy directions to 
avoid an unsustainable lock-in into a fossil fuel future. In the last decades, several other 
countries have successfully restructured their electricity sectors, for example by introducing 
a wholesale market for electricity under different electricity pricing systems, including nodal, 
zonal, or uniform pricing. These countries may hold valuable experiences of overcoming the 
historically grown barriers to successful RES integration through a greater role for market 
mechanisms. This paper develops three generic models that allow policymakers to analyze 
the impact of introducing either a nodal, a zonal, or a uniform pricing system on the three 
horns of the energy trilemma in their country. We evaluate our model using a simplified 
network representation of the Indonesian electricity sector. Our results indicate that each of 
the pricing systems is able to foster specific horns of the energy trilemma. Considering that 
any major reform intended to improve energy sustainability in Indonesia will only be a 
success if it also addresses energy security and energy equity, we also discuss our results 
from the perspective of energy justice and the need to balance the country’s energy trilemma. 
Ultimately, we illustrate a transformation pathway for a more sustainable and just transition 
to a low-carbon economy in Indonesia. 
 
Keywords: electricity pricing system, electricity market liberalization, energy trilemma, 
energy justice, Indonesia, renewable energy sources 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries around the world are implementing measures to increase the share of 
renewable energy sources (RESs). Historically, the focus of policymakers was primarily 
on achieving the first two horns of the energy trilemma, namely energy security and 
energy equity (Heffron, McCauley, and Rubens 2018). In particular, during the first 
wave of global electricity market restructuring that began in Chile, England and Wales, 
and Norway in the mid-1980s (Hogan 2002), policymakers aimed to improve both the 
operational and the economic efficiency of their energy systems (Conejo and Sioshansi 
2018). Corresponding reforms intended to improve the ability of the energy system to 
provide consumers with electricity reliably (referring to energy security) and at low 
costs (referring to energy equity). Because people generally viewed fossil fuel-based 
power plants as being more reliable and cost-efficient than RESs, project developers 
have primarily invested in conventional generation capacity. 
Today, as the negative consequences of fossil fuel-based electricity generation are 
becoming increasingly apparent in many countries, policymakers around the world  
are introducing new reforms to transform their energy systems from high-carbon into 
low-carbon systems; in particular, policymakers aim to replace conventional power 
plants with RESs. More than the first wave of electricity system reforms, international 
efforts such as the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or the 
2015 Paris Agreement will accelerate these new reforms—putting additional external 
pressure on energy policymakers to make their energy systems more sustainable. 
Here, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the past improvements in energy 
security and energy equity came at the expense of the third horn of the energy 
trilemma, namely energy sustainability: the RES uptake is still slow in many countries, 
and this is particularly true for developing and emerging countries (Tabrizian 2019). 
Therefore, policymakers may rebalance the energy trilemma and place more emphasis 
on environmental sustainability if the RES uptake and the energy transition are to  
be successful. 
One prime example of a country where a misfit of RES targets and actual policy 
reforms is apparent is Indonesia (Gunningham 2013). For many years, policymakers in 
Indonesia have relied on fossil power plants, mainly coal-fired power plants, to provide 
the population with reliable (i.e., energy security) and affordable (i.e., energy equity) 
electricity. Since Indonesia has not made much progress with regard to the 
liberalization described above, its current energy system is still heavily dependent  
on state control. As the country has considerable coal, gas, and oil resources, 
policymakers currently see fossil power plants as a low-cost way to generate electricity. 
In 2014, the government announced ambitious plans to increase the share of RESs in 
Indonesia’s energy mix. Given these targets, reforms of Indonesia’s energy system are 
now necessary to shift the country’s emphasis from fossil fuels to RESs. However, the 
past reforms that the country undertook to make renewables more cost-competitive 
with conventional power plants have so far proven to be less successful in Indonesia 
(Ditjen EBTKE 2019). Therefore, the government is in search of clear policy directions 
to push the RES uptake in the coming years.  
While the literature has discussed some small- to medium-scale reforms with respect to 
increasing the share of RESs in the Indonesian energy system (see, e.g., ADB 2019  
or Burke et al. 2019), in our paper, we instead suggest and address a major reform of 
the Indonesian electricity sector, namely the introduction of an energy-only wholesale 
market for electricity that currently does not exist, and, in particular, a corresponding 
new electricity pricing system. The latter relates to the method of implementing 
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wholesale prices, for instance in the form of a nodal pricing, a zonal pricing, or a 
uniform pricing system (Weibelzahl 2017). These three systems differ in the extent to 
which electricity trade accounts for the scarce transmission capacities of the network 
and whether post-trade redispatch is necessary. We rely on experiences from countries 
that have already successfully restructured their energy systems, including countries in 
Europe and the US. In particular, we draw on experiences from these countries 
regarding the benefits and challenges of each pricing system.  
Central to our research is the idea that any major reform that aims at improving energy 
sustainability in Indonesia must also meet the other two ongoing major objectives of the 
government (i.e., energy security and energy equity). Hence, the focus of our research 
is on answering the following research question (RQ): 
How can different electricity pricing systems support Indonesia in balancing its energy 
trilemma? 
To answer our RQ, we develop an economic model that we base on analytical 
modeling and that allows us to analyze private and public investment decisions in 
liberalized electricity markets; that is, we consider both generation and transmission 
investments. In particular, we develop a model for each of the three standard pricing 
systems that have emerged from the first wave of electricity market restructuring, 
specifically nodal pricing, zonal pricing, and uniform pricing (Weibelzahl 2017). The 
three model variants allow us to examine and to compare the investments under each 
of the three pricing systems and the respective impact on the energy trilemma.  
To illustrate the applicability of our model, we evaluate it with a simplified version of the 
Indonesian electricity network, focusing particularly on the Sumatra and Java–Bali 
electricity subnetworks. Subsequently, we discuss our results in the light of our RQ. In 
particular, we broaden the discussion toward an energy justice perspective on the 
energy trilemma, as Heffron, McCauley, and Rubens (2018) proposed. The concept of 
energy justice basically aims to enforce the observance of human rights across the 
entire energy life cycle. It has five forms at its core: distributive, procedural, recognition, 
restorative, and cosmopolitan justice (Heffron and McCauley 2017). Thus, we 
demonstrate the importance for Indonesian policymakers not only to improve energy 
sustainability but also to balance it with the interests of energy equity and energy 
security. Ultimately, we outline a first transformation pathway for a more sustainable 
and just transition to a low-carbon economy in Indonesia. 
With our paper, we aim to contribute to research and practice in at least five ways. 
First, based on our models, we illustrate how the introduction of liberalized markets, 
and of market-based pricing in particular, may support countries like Indonesia in 
balancing the energy trilemma and in reaching goals concerning increased RES 
penetration. Second, building on the experiences from other countries that have 
already implemented market-based pricing mechanisms, our paper describes how  
the models may work in practice and specifically how they may work in Indonesia,  
an emerging lower-middle-income economy (World Bank 2020c). Third, our paper 
analyzes and discusses the first and preliminary results using a simplified network 
model of Indonesia (i.e., the introduction of markets and different electricity pricing 
systems) from an energy justice perspective. Fourth, our model may generally provide 
policy-relevant insights for investment institutions (e.g., for development banks or other 
investment funds) by supporting decisions on funding strategies concerning energy 
transition projects. Finally, our research demonstrates how reform in the electricity 
sector can result in more just outcomes for society from policy decisions that aim to 
develop a low-carbon economy. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first presents the insights and 
experiences that we obtained from the existing literature on electricity pricing systems; 
second, it outlines the status quo of the Indonesian energy system and previous reform 
attempts. In Section 3, we develop our pricing models. Section 4 presents the data 
basis for the simplified Sumatra and Java–Bali electricity networks that we use in our 
evaluation. Section 5 discusses the results of our three pricing systems; in particular, 
we consider the results from an energy justice perspective on the energy trilemma. The 
penultimate section of our paper, Section 6, summarizes the implications for research 
and policymakers. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This section provides the relevant background for our analysis: First, we provide a  
brief overview of electricity pricing systems in the context of the worldwide electricity 
market liberalization; second, we describe the current Indonesian energy sector  
and the respective policy reforms that build the basis for our model evaluation  
(see Sections 4–6). 
2.1 Electricity Pricing Systems 
Within the last decades, the worldwide era of liberalization has affected many energy 
systems (Pollitt 2012). In the case of electricity systems, restructuring has typically 
taken shape through the introduction of wholesale markets for electricity and the 
corresponding implementation of different electricity pricing systems (Weibelzahl 2017). 
Policymakers in Chile, England and Wales, and Norway were among the first  
to introduce wholesale markets for electricity (Hogan 2002); others in many more 
countries around the world followed their example. By introducing these new markets, 
policymakers aimed at improving both the operational and the economic efficiency  
of electricity sectors to be able to provide consumers with electricity reliably  
(i.e., energy security) and at low costs (i.e., energy equity) (Conejo and Sioshansi 
2018). Not only by creating markets for free trade but also by breaking up vertically 
integrated monopolies, policymakers intended to foster competition, thereby lowering 
the prices and incentivizing private project developers to invest in generation capacity 
(Pollitt 2012). 
Various forms of restructured electricity markets have emerged around the world. They 
typically have in common a transmission sector that remains highly regulated, as are 
the associated public network investments (Vogelsang 2006). However, there are 
differences, particularly with respect to how wholesale market trade is organized using 
different design options for trade between different market players, including electricity 
generating companies and consumers. The literature has mainly discussed three 
different electricity pricing systems, namely nodal pricing, zonal pricing, and uniform 
pricing (Gan and Bourcier 2002; Leuthold, Weigt, and Hirschhausen 2008; Weibelzahl 
2017). These different pricing systems vary in the way in which they manage the 
limited transmission capacities of the network and in the way in which pricing rules take 
these scarce capacities into account. 
Under a nodal pricing system, all the economic and physical restrictions of the  
system are perfectly “integrated”; that is, the market equilibrium takes the relevant 
production-related, consumption-related, and transmission-related constraints into 
account (Singh, Hao, and Papalexopoulos 1998). Therefore, the resulting node-specific 
prices adequately reflect the local and temporal scarcity in the form of price peaks;  
for more original work on nodal pricing, see, for example, Bohn, Caramanis, and 
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Schweppe (1984), Schweppe et al. (1988), Hogan (1992), and Chao and Peck (1996). 
In contrast, a zonal pricing system pools nodes into different pricing zones that share a 
common price (Bjørndal and Jørnsten 2001). Hence, the zonal system considers the 
physical restrictions between the assumed price zones while neglecting the intra-zonal 
transmission restrictions. This requires ex post redispatch of the transmission system 
operator (TSO) resulting from the relaxation of the relevant physical transmission rules 
within zones during spot market trade, as the responsible TSO may not be able  
to transport the produced electricity to the corresponding consumers. Therefore, 
redispatch takes place in a second step, restoring physical feasibility at minimal cost 
(Burstedde 2012; Egerer, Weibezahn, and Hermann 2016). In this context, redispatch 
refers to either the upregulation or the downregulation of different electricity generators 
to ensure feasible electricity flows in the network without an overflow on the 
transmission lines; for more original work on zonal pricing, see, for example, Bjørndal, 
Jørnsten, and Pignon (2003) and Oggioni and Smeers (2013). Finally, a uniform pricing 
system completely ignores the physical transmission constraints at the electricity 
exchange (Kahn et al. 2001). It accounts only for production-related and consumption-
related constraints. As a direct consequence, redispatch takes place in a second step 
to deal with the corresponding transmission infeasibility. 
The chosen pricing systems directly determine the profitability of private investments in 
new generation capacity. Obviously, while the investors/operators of a power plant 
receive no location-specific investment signals under a uniform pricing system, nodal 
prices reward investments in locations where the generation capacity is scarce to a 
greater extent. Nevertheless, the large number of different prices in a nodal pricing 
system makes it highly complex and electricity consumers may perceive it to be unfair, 
as people in different network locations will typically pay different prices. Ultimately, the 
issue of choosing an adequate pricing system is a highly complex decision for 
policymakers. For all three of the systems, there are valuable experiences regarding 
the benefits and challenges from countries that have already successfully liberalized 
their electricity markets, for example the US (currently using nodal pricing; see, e.g., Gil 
and Lin 2013), Norway (currently using zonal pricing; see, e.g., Bjørndal and Jørnsten 
2001), and Germany (currently using uniform pricing; see, e.g., Müsgens, Ockenfels, 
and Peek 2014). Against this background, Table 1 summarizes some of the main 
benefits and challenges of the three different pricing systems that countries have 
experienced in the past.  
As already highlighted, the transmission sector is typically highly regulated, which 
implies that some kind of public entity often makes network investment decisions. In 
addition to the already high complexity of a pure cost–benefit analysis (with respect to 
the effects on the short-run network operation) of a possible network extension project, 
what complicates network investment decisions even more is the fact that they will 
generally affect electricity prices under the chosen pricing system. In turn, the price 
changes may influence private investments in new generation capacity, as described 
above. Therefore, the chosen pricing system will also have a severe impact on the 
question of which public network investments are necessary to avoid negatively 
affecting the investment behavior of private companies. Ultimately, this clearly 
highlights the high degree of interdependency of the different investment decisions and 
the many possible side effects associated with the introduction of a pricing system that 
policymakers can hardly anticipate without the help of quantitative economic models, 
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Table 1: Experiences with Different Pricing Systems  
Pricing System Benefits Challenges 
Nodal pricing • Efficient dispatch of generation 
• Local signals/incentives in long-run 
investments 
• No redispatch necessary 
• High system complexity 
• Many small submarkets with possibly low 
competition and market power abuse 
• Fluctuating local prices 
Zonal pricing • Reduced number of different prices 
• Increased intra-zonal competition 
• Price stability 
• Possibly inefficient dispatch of power 
plants 
• Reduced signals for flexibility 
• No local signals/incentives for long-run 
investments 
• Difficult determination of zonal 
boundaries  
• Possibly high redispatch costs and 
associated reallocation issues 
• Defining adequate remuneration for 
redispatch services 
Uniform pricing • High market liquidity 
• Low system complexity 
• Relatively high competition 
• Price stability 
• Possibly inefficient dispatch of power 
plants 
• Possibly inefficient long-run investments 
• Possibly high redispatch costs and 
associated reallocation issues 
Source: Authors’ creation from the review of Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001), Gil and Lin (2013), Müsgens, Ockenfels, and 
Peek (2014), and Weibelzahl (2017). 
Figure 1: Decision Sequences under Different Pricing Systems 
 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
To give an overview of the relevant public and private decision making under each  
of the three pricing systems, we illustrate the corresponding decision sequences 
accounting for both long-run investment decisions and short-run market clearing in 
Figure 1. Here, public network investment choices (decision level 1) are followed by 
expected private generation investments and spot market trade (decision level 2).  
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In the case of zonal and uniform pricing, spot market trade is followed by redispatch of 
the TSO (decision level 3) to restore the transmission feasibility. 
2.2 The Indonesian Energy System 
Given the different pricing systems, our paper investigates how these pricing systems 
may support Indonesia in increasing its RES generation. Therefore, we provide a brief 
overview of the Indonesian energy sector. 
With more than 267 million citizens, Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous 
country (World Bank 2019b). It has the biggest economy in Southeast Asia and ranks 
16th among the world’s economies in terms of total GDP (World Bank 2019a). 
Positioned between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, Indonesia is additionally 
the world’s biggest island state, consisting of 17,508 islands, around 6,000 of which  
are inhabited. With respect to its electricity sector, the term “archipelago” perfectly 
describes the Indonesian electricity network, which consists of eight major and around 
600 isolated networks (Burke et al. 2019). During the first wave of global electricity 
market restructuring, Indonesia made its first privatization efforts by opening its 
electricity generation sector to independent power producers (IPPs) in the 1990s 
(Maulidia et al. 2019). Today, however, there are only a few IPPs in Indonesia and  
the liberalization appears to be incomplete. In particular, the state-owned enterprise 
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) and its subsidiaries still own more than 75% of the 
generation capacity in the country (Maulidia et al. 2019). No further significant 
privatization has taken place, which is why—except for electricity generation—the state 
controls Indonesia’s electricity sector; that is, PLN controls the network and sells 
electricity to consumers (Burke et al. 2019). The current organization of the Indonesian 
electricity sector is as a single-buyer market (Sakya et al. 2006). Typically, under such 
a market design, countries preserve an artificial monopoly over the electricity sector 
even after formally unbundling the vertically integrated state-owned enterprise (i.e., 
PLN in Indonesia) (Lovei 2000). In fact, PLN buys all the electricity produced in 
Indonesia (as a single buyer) and resells it to electricity consumers at regulated prices.   
In terms of energy security, Indonesia has struggled to provide its citizens with access 
to electricity and has performed poorly for many years in this respect compared with 
other Southeast Asian countries (Maulidia et al. 2019). In 2010, roughly 14 million 
Indonesians (i.e., 5.85% of the population) had no access to electricity (World Bank 
2020a), which is why improving the electrification rate has been a key priority of 
policymakers in the past decade (Maulidia et al. 2019). Indeed, by 2017, the 
electrification rate had improved: now only 4.9 million Indonesians (i.e., 1.86% of the 
population) are without electricity access (World Bank 2020a). However, this number is 
misleading. First, electrification varies from region to region in Indonesia. For example, 
while the electrification rate is 100% in Java, outside of Java it is only 90.45%; in 
regions like Papua (42.5%) or Jambi (51.91%), the electrification rate is significantly 
lower (PT PLN 2019a). Second, power cuts are frequent for many Indonesians across 
all regions (Gunningham 2013). The Indonesian electricity network is still very 
unreliable since there is a lack of generation and network capacity.  
In terms of energy equity, Indonesia is making efforts to keep retail prices low for its 
citizens to combat poverty. In 2010, roughly 38 million Indonesians (i.e., 15.7%) lived in 
poverty, that is, on $1.90 a day (World Bank 2020b). Against this background, ensuring 
low retail prices for electricity was and still is a key measure for the Indonesian 
Government in its fight against poverty (Maulidia et al. 2019). This is why retail prices 
are set by the government in Indonesia, as described above. To improve both energy 
security and energy equity, Indonesia’s policymakers have focused on the expansion of 
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fossil power plants—above all, coal-fired power plants. Here, the policymakers base 
their rationale on the supposed advantages of coal over other options. Not only does 
Indonesia have large domestic coal reserves, but also its coal-fired power plants are 
capable of providing the necessary base load power (Gunningham 2013). Further, 
policymakers view coal-fired power plants as being easy to finance and quick to build. 
To support the domestic production and thereby ensure an adequate electricity supply 
and lower the costs of electricity production, the government ultimately subsidizes fossil 
fuels like coal or oil. 
This focus on an energy supply chain based on fossil fuels has resulted in a situation 
that mainly neglects the third horn of the energy trilemma, energy sustainability, in 
Indonesia. Today, RESs like solar or wind power only make up a fraction of Indonesia’s 
energy mix—despite the country having huge renewable potential (Dutu 2016). Only in 
2014 did the government announce ambitious goals to develop RESs in Indonesia: 
compared with 6% in 2014, RESs are to account for 23% of the energy mix by 2025 
and even 31% by 2050 (Maulidia et al. 2019). However, recent estimates have 
suggested that Indonesia will not reach its 2025 and 2050 goals at the current RES 
development rates (Burke et al. 2019). One of the key barriers to RES development is 
that the current design of the Indonesian energy system does not allow RESs to 
become competitive with fossil power plants (Burke et al. 2019; Maulidia et al. 2019). 
What is therefore necessary is a fundamental reform of the energy system so that 
Indonesia is able to achieve its RES targets—and avoids ending up locked into a fossil 
fuel future (Liebman et al. 2019). 
Indeed, the Indonesian Government has launched a series of reforms over the past ten 
years to strengthen RESs. However, these reforms were not very successful in terms 
of the market penetration of RESs. For example, within the last ten years, the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) has made repeated efforts to push  
the development of solar PV in Indonesia. From 2013 onwards, the MEMR tried to 
improve the situation for developers through five key regulations (i.e., No. 17/2013, 
19/2016, 12/2017, 50/2017, and 4/2020) (Kennedy 2018). In 2013, the MEMR 
introduced the first auction program for solar PV in Indonesia (Reg. No. 17/2013) 
(MEMR 2013). Although the program covered 140 MW in over 80 locations, it only 
realized two projects due to protests from PLN and local manufacturers, who opposed 
the favorable tariffs for solar PV developers. Moreover, it was not private investors but 
rather two state-owned companies that implemented the two actually realized projects 
(Kennedy 2018). 
In 2016, the MEMR introduced a feed-in tariff for solar PV projects, collectively 
covering at least 5,000 MW (Reg. No. 19/2016) (MEMR 2016). However, the regulation 
included restrictions on the project size and foreign ownership, discouraging 
international developers. Only a couple of months later, it abandoned these feed-in 
tariffs (Kennedy 2018). Instead, from 2017 onward, the MEMR regulated the tariffs that 
solar PV developers can charge to PLN (Reg. No. 12/2017) (MEMR 2017b), basing  
tariffs on and limiting them to a maximum of 85% of the local and national average 
costs of generation. In addition, it differentiated them geographically (Kennedy 2018). 
Reacting to stakeholders’ new protests, it eventually replaced Reg. No. 12/2017 with 
Reg. No. 50/2017 (MEMR 2017a). One major difference between the two regulations  
is that the new one forced RES developers to transfer ownership of their facilities to 
PLN on completion of power purchase agreements. In combination with the tariff limits, 
the situation for investments in RES plants was not attractive in terms of recovering 
project costs (Kennedy 2018). In 2020, the MEMR introduced Reg. No. 4/2020,  
which stipulates amendments for Reg. No. 50/2017 to overcome key items in Reg.  
No. 50/2017 that had become barriers to RES development (e.g., at the end of power 
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purchase agreements, IPPs no longer had to transfer the ownership of their facilities to 
PLN). The amendments provide more flexibility for investors and aim to accelerate 
RES growth in Indonesia.   
To summarize, Indonesia’s energy policy to promote RES development to date has 
suffered from several major changes in direction (e.g., the shift from feed-in tariffs to 
regulated tariffs) as well as from an overall tendency to retain at least some state 
control over new projects. The government’s RES development strategy has therefore 
not proven to be successful so far. Ultimately, the government is in search of  
clear policy directions to promote an increase in the number of RES plants in the 
coming years. In the next section, we will therefore develop a model to assess the 
impacts of a major reform in Indonesia that builds on the introduction of an energy-only 
wholesale market. 
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Notation and Economic Quantities 
In this section, we first introduce the economic set-up for the three pricing models of 
nodal, zonal, and uniform pricing, which we will present in more detail in Section 3.2. 
Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 in Appendix 1 provide a short summary of the main sets, 
parameters, and variables that we use in our paper. 
3.1.1  Planning Horizon and Electricity Network 
𝑇𝑇 = {1, … , |𝑇𝑇|}  describes the finite planning horizon. In addition, we assume an 
electricity network 𝒢𝒢 = (𝑁𝑁, 𝐿𝐿) that consists of a set of network nodes 𝑁𝑁 and a set of 
transmission lines 𝐿𝐿 interconnecting the different nodes. 
We describe each transmission line 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿 using its maximal transmission capacity 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙 
and its susceptance 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 . Accounting for possible network investments from a public 
entity like a responsible TSO, the subset 𝐿𝐿new ⊆ 𝐿𝐿  collects all the candidate 
transmission lines for the responsible TSO’s investments. In analogy, subset 𝐿𝐿ex ⊆ 𝐿𝐿 ∖
𝐿𝐿new collects all the existing transmission lines of network 𝒢𝒢. 
As new transmission lines are typically characterized by high fixed costs, we model 
network investments as zero–one decisions using a binary variable 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ∈ {0, 1}. The 
latter is equal to one if and only if the TSO builds 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿new. The given cost parameter  
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 describes investments in line 𝑙𝑙.  
3.1.2  Electricity Demand 
𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁  collects all the nodes of the network containing electricity consumers. We 
assume an elastic long-term demand for each time period 𝑡𝑡 and demand node 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 
using the following linear demand function: 
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In the inverse demand function (1), 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 denotes the endogenous demand quantity of 
consumer 𝑐𝑐 in time period 𝑡𝑡 while 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐  are the ex ante given parameters that 
specify the actual demand function. 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)  gives the resulting prices for a given 
quantity of  𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 . We note that the assumption of an elastic demand is quite common in 
the electricity market literature; see, for example, Chao and Peck (1996), Bjørndal and 
Jørnsten (2001), Bjørndal, Jørnsten, and Pignon (2003), Ehrenmann and Smeers 
(2005), Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2007), Pechan (2017), or Weibelzahl and Märtz (2020). 
Using the above demand function, the following gives the gross consumer surplus, 










3.1.3  Electricity Generation 
Renewable Electricity Generators 
Let us use a set of carbon-neutral, renewable electricity generators 𝑅𝑅 . The subset 
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛  ⊆ 𝑅𝑅  comprises all the renewable generators that are located at network node  
𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁. 
We assume that the set of generators 𝑅𝑅  consists of both existing and candidate 
generators; that is, we partition the set of renewable generators 𝑅𝑅 into a set of existing 
generators 𝑅𝑅ex and a set of candidate generators 𝑅𝑅new. Corresponding investments of 
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 per unit of installed generation capacity 𝑦𝑦�𝑟𝑟new arise for each candidate generator. In 
analogy, ?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟ex describes the installed capacity of an existing generator. 
Accounting for fluctuations in power production, for each generator 𝑟𝑟 , we assume 
relative availability 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ∈ [0, 1] of electricity generation capacity in time period 𝑡𝑡. As this 
parameter refers to the relative availability of the corresponding resources, like wind or 
sun, it depends both on the time period 𝑡𝑡 and on the location of the generator; for 
example, at night, there will be no sun, meaning that there is availability of zero. Thus, 
in each time period and for each renewable generator, 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐  limits the maximum 
electricity output. Given this capacity bound, we then model the actually chosen 
electricity output using the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 . 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0  describes the variable per-unit 
production costs.  
Conventional Electricity Generators 
Set 𝐺𝐺 contains all the conventional electricity generators in the system. Analogous to 
the renewable generators above, we describe with 𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 ⊆ 𝐺𝐺 the subset of conventional 
electricity generators located at network node 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁.  
We describe generator 𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺  using its variable per-unit production cost 𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0. The 
endogenous variable 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0  gives the realized electricity output of generator 𝑔𝑔  in 
period 𝑡𝑡 . Similar to renewable generators, we partition the set of conventional 
generators 𝐺𝐺  into a set of pre-existing generators 𝐺𝐺ex  and a set of candidate 
generators 𝐺𝐺new. It is possible to invest in the latter with investments of 𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 per unit of 
installed generation capacity 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new . For all existing generators, the corresponding 
generation capacity is 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔ex. 
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3.2 Modeling Different Pricing Systems 
In the following, we develop the models for the three different pricing systems; see also 
Grimm et al. (2016) and Weibelzahl and Märtz (2020) for similar models. In particular, 
we will present step by step the decision levels (hereinafter levels) under each of the 
pricing systems according to Figure 1 in Section 2.1. From a mathematical point of 
view, our models represent multilevel optimization problems, in which the different 
players anticipate the optimal decisions that the other players take on subsequent 
levels; for example, the TSO chooses the optimal line investments on the first level, 
forming expectations of the optimal private generation investments, spot market 
outcomes, and necessary redispatch interventions on the subsequent levels. 
The formulation of the public network investments of the TSO, that is, decision level 1 
(see Section 3.2.1), is identical for all three of the systems. As decision level 2, that is, 
expected private generation investments and spot market trade, as well as decision 
level 3, that is, necessary redispatch of the TSO, differ for each of the systems, we 
model these levels in system-specific sections (see Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4). 
3.2.1  Public Network Investments of the TSO (Decision Level 1) 
On the first level and for all three pricing systems, we assume a benevolent TSO that 
















The TSO accounts for the integrality of its network investment decisions and expects 
optimal private generation investments as well as spot market (and redispatch) 
outcomes of the subsequent levels (see also the following sections). 
𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ∈ {0, 1}     ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿new. (4) 
3.2.2  Nodal Pricing (Decision Level 2) 
On the second level, we model the investment and spot market bidding of perfectly 
competitive companies for a nodal pricing system; see, for example, Boucher and 
Smeers (2001), Daxhelet and Smeers (2007), Grimm et al. (2016), and Weibelzahl 
(2017) for the assumption of perfect competition on electricity markets. As a well-
known and established standard in the literature, perfect competition allows us to 
formulate investment and market clearing as a single welfare maximization problem 



















We first require a nodal flow balance according to  








 ∀𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (6) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛in(𝐿𝐿)  and 𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛out(𝐿𝐿)  collect all the ingoing and outgoing lines of node n, 
respectively. In addition, all the power flows must account for their lower and upper  
flow bounds:  
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (7) 
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (8) 
According to Kirchhoff’s Laws, the following determines the power flows on the different 
transmission lines: 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 = 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙(𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐)    ∀𝑙𝑙 = (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝐿𝐿ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (9) 
−𝑀𝑀(1 −𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙(𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐) ≤ 𝑀𝑀(1 −𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙)    ∀𝑙𝑙 = (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝐿𝐿new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (10) 
In the above constraints, 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐  gives the phase angle at node n in time period t. In 
addition, parameter M is a sufficiently large constant that we denote as big-M. 
The phase angle of reference node 1 is set to zero, ensuring unique phase angle 
values in the electricity system: 
𝜃𝜃1𝑐𝑐 = 0    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (11) 
Given the current weather conditions together with the private generation investments 
undertaken, the power production is limited according to:  
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟ex     ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (12) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (13) 
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0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔ex    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇,  (14) 
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇  (15) 
Finally, all the investment variables ?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new, 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new must be non-negative: 
?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new ≥ 0    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅new, (16) 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new ≥ 0    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺new. (17) 
3.2.3  Zonal Pricing (Decision Levels 2 and 3) 
Spot Market Trade and Private Investments in New Generation Capacities 
In the case of zonal pricing, we partition the node set 𝑁𝑁 into 𝑘𝑘 connected, non-empty 
price zones 𝑍𝑍1, … ,𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘. 𝒵𝒵 = {1, … ,𝑘𝑘} gives the set of price zone indices, for which the 
responsible public entities, for example regulators, governments, or TSOs, specify 𝑘𝑘 ex 
ante. In the following, we assume transfer capacity-based market coupling, that is, we 
use only restrictions relating to the available transfer capacities between zones. As a 
consequence, the zone-specific prices do not account for possible intra-zonal network 
congestion, but companies exclusively receive price signals incentivizing them not to 
exceed the inter-zonal transmission capacities. For the ease of notation, we let 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖nter be 
the set of all inter-zone transmission lines. Again, we model the optimal investment 














In contrast to nodal flow balance, we now only require zonal flow balance: 
� 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛∈𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖












 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒵𝒵, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇.        (19) 
The following restrict the power flows on inter-zonal transmission lines: 
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿ex ∩ 𝐿𝐿inter, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (20) 
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿new ∩ 𝐿𝐿inter, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (21) 
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Again, given the current weather conditions and the generation investment, the power 
production must be feasible: 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟ex    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (22) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (23) 
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔ex    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (24) 
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇 (25) 
Finally, as with nodal pricing, all the investment variables must be non-negative: 
?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new ≥ 0    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅new, (26) 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new ≥ 0    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺new. (27) 
Redispatch 
On the redispatch level, the TSO redispatches the contracted spot market volumes, 
restoring the feasibility of power flows while minimizing the arising redispatch costs. 
Here, the final quantities after redispatch may be smaller than, equal to, or larger than 
the pre-redispatch quantities, that is, the contracted spot market quantities. Throughout 
the paper, we indicate redispatch adjustments with ∆; for example, ∆𝑦𝑦1,2= 5 indicates 
that the TSO asks conventional power generator 1 to increase its production by 5 units 
in period 2. In the following, we will use a cost-based redispatch mechanism that is, for 
instance, in use in Germany. Under such a mechanism, redispatch is profit neutral and 
only accounts for additional or saved costs associated with a redispatch intervention to 
avoid gaming problems or market power abuse. We can therefore state the redispatch 











where we also assume that redispatch can apply to both producers and consumers.  
Similar to the above nodal pricing formulation, power balance is imposed for each node 
on the redispatch level: 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 = � (𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)
𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
+ ��𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐�
𝑔𝑔∈𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛
 
+ � (𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)
𝑙𝑙∈𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛in(𝐿𝐿)
− � (𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)
𝑙𝑙∈𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛out(𝐿𝐿)
 
∀𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (29) 
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After redispatch, all the power flows must be physically feasible:  
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (30) 
−𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙    ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (31) 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 = 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙(𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐)   ∀𝑙𝑙 = (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝐿𝐿ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (32) 
−𝑀𝑀(1 −𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) ≤ 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 − 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙(𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐)
≤ 𝑀𝑀(1 −𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) 
∀𝑙𝑙 = (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝐿𝐿new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (33) 
𝜃𝜃1𝑐𝑐 = 0    ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (34) 
Finally, when choosing the optimal redispatch, the TSO must take both the private 
generation investments and the exogenous weather conditions into account:  
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟ex    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (35) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟new    ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑅new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (36) 
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔ex    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺ex, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, (37) 
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 + ∆𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔new    ∀𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺new, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (38) 
3.2.4  Uniform Pricing (Decision Levels 2 and 3) 
Spot Market Trade and Private Investments in New Generation Capacities 
It is possible to view uniform pricing as a special case of the above zonal pricing model 
in which we only have a single price zone, that is, 𝑘𝑘 = 1. As a direct consequence, we 
have the same model as in Section 3.2.3 except for the fact, instead of zonal balance, 







 ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑇. (39) 
Redispatch 
Similar to the case of zonal pricing, uniform pricing will also in general require 
redispatch to ensure transmission feasibility. Such redispatch can be modeled in the 
same way as in Section 3.2.3. 
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4. DATA AND EVALUATION SET-UP 
In this section, we apply the models that we developed in Section 3 to a simplified 
representation of the Indonesian electricity sector. In particular, we restrict our analysis 
to the electricity systems of Sumatra and Java–Bali. Subsequently, we briefly outline 
the data basis for our computations; we provide additional information on the data that 
we use in Appendix 2. 
4.1 Electricity Network 
Our network of Sumatra and Java–Bali consists of 16 nodes: one node per province in 
the geographical units of Sumatra and Java and one node for Bali in the geographical 
unit of the Lesser Sunda Islands; see also Table 6 in Appendix 2. We based our data 
and assumptions concerning the existing transmission lines on IESR (2019a) and 
MEMR (2019). Currently, the two islands of Sumatra and Java–Bali are not connected. 
We allowed investments in new lines between neighboring nodes, as well as between 
nodes 6, 7, and 9 (Sumatra) and nodes 10, 11, and 12 (Java), to enable a possible 
interconnection between the two islands. For the cost parameters of network 
investments, we referred to Chang and Li (2015). Figure 2 illustrates our network 
topology with the considered nodes and lines. 
Figure 2: Network Topology Illustrating the Considered Nodes and Lines 
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4.2 Electricity Generation 
We based the data concerning the existing generation capacities on PLN’s 2018 
Rencana Usaha Penyediaan Tenaga Listrik [Power Supply Business Plan] (PT PLN 
2018); see Table 7 in Appendix 2 for an overview of the existing generation capacities 
located at each node. We considered all the power plants that are currently installed as 
existing power plants in our model. As Table 8 shows, currently around 88% of the 
installed generation capacity relates to conventional power plants, with coal-fired power 
plants accounting for 53% of the total installed generation capacity. Table 8 in 
Appendix 2 summarizes the assumptions concerning the techno-economic parameters 
of each generation technology. Except for coal-fired power plants, we allowed 
investments in new generation units at all nodes. We restricted investments in new 
coal-fired power plants to those nodes where coal-fired power plants are currently at 
the planning or construction stages, that is, nodes 2, 7, 9, 12, 13, and 16 (Global 
Energy Monitor 2020). This approach in particular aimed to exclude the possibility of 
building coal-fired power plants in regions where this is probably not possible due to 
real-life restrictions, such as geographical conditions or political resistance to coal-fired 
power plants. For investments in RESs, we set limits that determine the maximum 
amount of cumulated capacity that it is possible to invest in at each node. We intended 
these limits to reflect the respective potentials of each RES technology in each 
province; we took these data from Ditjen EBTKE (2016). 
4.3 Electricity Demand 
As we could not observe the real-world electricity demand functions of consumers in 
Indonesia because the government still sets the prices, we calibrated hourly demand 
functions for a representative day (with 24 hourly time intervals) at each node. Here, 
we based our derivation of demand functions on the cumulative annual demand  
at each node (PT PLN 2019b), the average retail price at each node (PT PLN 2019a), 
the characteristics of a typical daily load curve of the Java–Bali electricity sector (Batih 
and Sorapipatana 2016), and the long-term price elasticity of demand of Indonesian 
consumers (Burke and Kurniawati 2018). We assume here that the demand curves that 
we calculated tend to be a rather conservative estimate—the actual demand could 
therefore be higher. 
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the computational results of our evaluation (i.e., for the 
Sumatra and Java–Bali electricity sectors). For a detailed analysis and discussion of 
the results, see Section 6. We implemented the three pricing systems using the 
modeling language Zimpl (see Koch 2004) and used SCIP 6.0.2 (see Gleixner et al. 
2018) to generate corresponding mps files. We then solved the problems with the 
CPLEX 12.10 solver (see IBM 2019). Given the corresponding results, we then 
calculated various key indicators for all three pricing systems. In particular, we 
computed (1) the welfare level and the consumer surplus, (2) private generation 
investments, (3) public network investments, (4) redispatch costs, and (5) resulting 
electricity prices; see Table 2 for an overview of the main computational results of the 
three models. For the zonal pricing system, we partitioned the 16 nodes into two price 
zones, in which nodes 1–9 belong to one price zone (hereinafter: “Sumatra”) and 
nodes 10–16 belong to another price zone (hereinafter: “Java–Bali”). This partition 
reflects the two islands of Sumatra and Java–Bali (see Figure 2). 
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Table 2: Computational Results for All Three Pricing Systems; All Values Except 
for Normalized Welfare and Electricity Prices Are Rounded to Full Values 
 Pricing System 
 Unit Nodal Zonal Uniform 
Normalized welfare % 100 99.34 94.06 
Absolute welfare $ 65,881,637 65,446,813 61,968,708 
Consumer surplus $ 83,211,566 82,540,830 81,128,565 
Redispatch costs $ – 1,123,400 4,514,538 
Aggregated renewable capacity added MW 54,153 56,162 64,406 
Aggregated conventional capacity added MW 19,435 16,123 7,105 
Overall generation capacity added MW 73,588 72,285 71,511 
Aggregated network capacity added MW 3,000 4,400 12,544 
Number of lines added - 3 5 13 
Aggregated renewable investment  $ 7,864,540 8,403,509 10,646,770 
Aggregated conventional investment  $ 2,706,683 2,245,415 989,516 
Aggregated network investment  $ 216,000 316,800 903,168 
Average electricity price $/MWh 29.06 31.33 32.45 
– for consumers in price zone “Sumatra” $/MWh 26.21 30.28 32.45 
– for consumers in price zone “Java–Bali” $/MWh 32.72 32.69 32.45 
Aggregated renewable generation MWh 450,705 466,524 430,912 
Aggregated conventional generation MWh 248,025 218,583 222,275 
Aggregated electricity consumption MWh 698,730 685,107 653,187 
Abbreviations: MW = megawatt, MWh = megawatt-hour. 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
First, we calculated the welfare levels realized under the three pricing systems (i.e., we 
calculated the aggregated difference between the consumer surplus and all the costs 
of production and investments). In line with the literature that considered nodal pricing 
to be the most efficient in terms of welfare (Weibelzahl 2017), we normalized the 
realized welfare under the nodal pricing system to 100%. Our results illustrate that  
the welfare decreases when pooling nodes into one or more zones: under zonal and 
uniform pricing, the normalized welfare is 99.34% and 94.06%, respectively. However, 
when comparing the uniform with the zonal pricing system, our results illustrate that 
market splitting (i.e., introducing two price zones) increases welfare. In addition to the 
welfare levels, we computed the (gross) consumer surpluses under each pricing 
system (i.e., the monetary benefits for consumers). Here, the order is the same as 
before, with nodal pricing yielding the highest and uniform pricing yielding the lowest 
consumer surplus. While we noted that the levels of welfare and consumer surplus do 
not differ enormously over the three pricing systems, our results highlight a clear 
decreasing trend of welfare and consumer surplus from nodal over zonal to uniform 
pricing. 
Second, we computed the private investments in renewable and conventional 
generation. With respect to renewables, the maximum capacity of 64,406 MW occurs 
under the uniform pricing system. The zonal and nodal pricing systems show 
approximately 8,000–10,000 MW less of renewables, with 56,162 MW and 54,153 MW, 
respectively. With respect to conventional generators, the order is exactly the opposite: 
19,435 MW under the nodal pricing system, 16,123 MW under the zonal pricing 
system, and only 7,105 MW under the uniform pricing system.  
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Third, we calculated the corresponding network investments. Under the nodal pricing 
system, there are three transmission lines; under the zonal pricing system, there are 
five transmission lines; and under the uniform pricing system, there are 13 lines. 
Moreover, our results illustrate that, under all three pricing systems, transmission lines 
connect the two islands of Sumatra and Java-Bali. It is possible to explain the 
considerably higher number of lines under the uniform pricing system by referring to 
the decision levels of the three models: under the uniform pricing system, private firms 
cannot and/or do not take network constraints into account and make their investment 
decisions independently from these constraints, meaning that they consider the 
network as a “copperplate” (Weibelzahl 2017) and do not receive location-specific 
investment signals. Accordingly, the TSO must adapt the network to the anticipated 
higher generation level and invest in the appropriate lines to transport electricity to the 
respective consumers. The respective redispatch costs also reflect this. 
Fourth, we compute the redispatch costs. Under uniform pricing, the redispatch costs 
are roughly four times higher than the redispatch costs under zonal pricing. Following a 
similar logic as with the number of constructed lines, the higher redispatch costs that 
we observed under uniform pricing again result from private firms completely ignoring 
the network constraints when making their investment decisions. In contrast, while 
private firms do not consider the intra-zonal network constraints under zonal pricing, 
they nevertheless account for the inter-zonal network constraints. Therefore, in line 
with the literature (Ding and Fuller 2005), the redispatch costs are lower under the 
zonal pricing system than under the uniform pricing system. 
Fifth, we calculated the resulting electricity prices for the three pricing systems. On 
average (i.e., over all nodes and time periods), consumers pay the lowest electricity 
price under the nodal pricing system, followed by the zonal pricing system. The highest 
average electricity price occurs under the uniform pricing system; see Section 6.2 for a 
more in-depth analysis and discussion of the resulting electricity prices. 
6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, we discuss our results and derive implications for policy and research. 
In particular, we examine the results from three perspectives. First, we address our RQ 
and discuss how the three pricing systems may support Indonesia in balancing its 
energy trilemma. Second, we broaden our discussion toward an energy justice 
perspective on the energy trilemma. Finally, we summarize the implications that follow 
the previous steps and highlight a transition path for Indonesia toward a just low-carbon 
energy system.   
6.1 Balancing Indonesia’s Energy Trilemma 
To date, as Section 2.2 discussed in detail, Indonesian policymakers have traditionally 
focused on energy security and energy equity. In 2014, by announcing its ambitious 
goals to develop RESs, the government demonstrated its political will to put more 
emphasis on the previously neglected third horn of the energy trilemma, namely energy 
sustainability. In line with our RQ, our primary aim in this paper is to investigate how 
the introduction of a wholesale market for electricity, and of different electricity pricing 
systems in particular, may support Indonesia in balancing its energy trilemma. Hence, 
we analyze and discuss the impacts of the three pricing systems on the horns of the 
energy trilemma in the following. 
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6.1.1  Energy Sustainability 
This horn of the energy trilemma emphasizes the impacts of all energy-related activities 
on the environment. Assuming that RESs in general have a less damaging impact  
on the environment than conventional power plants, for example through lower 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it would be preferable to choose the pricing system 
with (1) the most RESs and/or (2) the fewest conventional power plants. Based on the 
results that we derived from our models and using the simplified representation of the 
Sumatra and Java–Bali electricity systems, this would be the uniform pricing system. 
Compared with the nodal (zonal) pricing system, under the uniform pricing system, 
there is around 10,000 MW (8,000 MW) more RES capacity and around 12,000 MW 
(9,000 MW) less conventional capacity. Comparing nodal with zonal pricing indicates 
that the zonal pricing system would be the second-best option with respect to energy 
sustainability. 
6.1.2  Energy Security 
This horn of the energy trilemma emphasizes that adequate generation capacity is 
available and that it is possible to transport the generated electricity reliably to the 
consumers. Our results indicate that all three pricing systems incentivize additional 
investments that are remunerated via prices: as Section 5 described, each pricing 
system allows the addition of both renewable and conventional generation capacities. 
Furthermore, under all three pricing systems, the TSO invests in the necessary network 
capacity to integrate the private investments in the best possible way into the overall 
system. As the private investments vary between the three pricing systems, the optimal 
network investments also depend on the respective market design. In particular, our 
results illustrate that, under nodal and zonal pricing, the TSO would build only three 
and five new lines, with an aggregated capacity of 3,000 MW and 4,400 MW, 
respectively, while, under uniform pricing, it would construct 13 new lines, with an 
aggregated capacity of 12,544 MW. Ultimately, all three systems contribute to energy 
security in the sense that they add new capacities to the system. However, what 
distinguishes the zonal and uniform pricing systems from the nodal pricing system with 
respect to energy security is that redispatch is necessary under the latter two systems. 
Here, it is important to implement redispatch appropriately, as blackouts or brownouts 
may otherwise occur. 
6.1.3  Energy Equity 
This horn of the energy trilemma emphasizes the affordability of energy services, 
mainly from the perspective of consumers. Two indicators from our results allow us to 
draw conclusions regarding which pricing system seems to have advantages for this 
horn of the trilemma. First, comparing the electricity prices resulting under each pricing 
system reveals that the lowest average electricity price occurs under the nodal pricing 
system (i.e., 29.06 $/MWh), with the zonal (i.e., 31.33 $/MWh) and the uniform pricing 
system (i.e., 32.45 $/MWh) in the second and third places, respectively. For a detailed 
discussion, please see Section 6.2. Second, the consumer surplus—indicating the 
realized monetary benefits for consumers—is higher under the nodal pricing system 
than under the zonal pricing system. The uniform pricing system is the one that yields 
the lowest consumer surplus. 
To summarize, our results, which we presented in Section 5, indicate that, for the 
simplified representation of the Sumatra and Java–Bali energy system, there may be 
evidence that a nodal pricing system can support Indonesia in achieving energy equity 
(see Section 6.2); a uniform pricing system may support Indonesia in achieving energy 
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sustainability under the given input parameters; and all three pricing systems may 
support Indonesia in achieving energy security but vary in the exact investment 
amounts. Nodal pricing produces the overall welfare optimum. However, we noted that 
the overall results for the model of the zonal pricing system are very similar to the 
results that we obtained under the nodal pricing system: in particular, welfare 
decreases only by 0.66 percentage points under the zonal pricing system compared 
with the nodal pricing system. As we discussed in Section 2.1, a nodal pricing system 
may yield greater complexity than a zonal pricing system. Accordingly, when deciding 
which pricing system to implement, policymakers’ decisions may also reflect this 
circumstance. Hence, for our simplified representation, zonal pricing might actually 
have advantages over nodal pricing. Finally, the above results underline our discussion 
of the three pricing systems in Section 2.1: considering the three horns of the energy 
trilemma that policymakers focus on, no “best” pricing system exists; rather, the three 
pricing systems have quite different impacts. When considering the three pricing 
systems, policymakers may therefore reflect on which horn(s) of the energy trilemma 
their country needs to focus on in the future. Furthermore, policymakers may take the 
concept of energy justice into account, and the following section discusses this further. 
6.2 An Energy Justice Perspective on Indonesia’s  
Energy Trilemma 
As a consequence of the challenges that the previous section discussed,  literature has 
highlighted the possibility of resolving the problem of balancing the energy trilemma 
through energy justice; see, for example, Heffron, McCauley, and Sovacool (2015) or 
Heffron, McCauley, and Rubens (2018). In particular, Maulidia et al. (2019) recently 
proposed this approach for Indonesia. In brief, energy justice is about the application of 
human rights across the energy life cycle; in particular, there are five forms of justice  
at its core: distributive, procedural, recognition, restorative, and cosmopolitan justice 
(Heffron and McCauley 2017). Given these five forms of energy justice, applying a 
distribution justice perspective to our results in particular promises valuable additional 
insights. Subsequently, we therefore focused our analysis on the distributional effects 
of the three pricing systems. However, we will also briefly address the remaining four 
forms of energy justice below and describe how they may relate to our results in the 
context of introducing a wholesale market for electricity in Indonesia. 
Distributive justice emphasizes the distribution of benefits and drawbacks resulting 
from the energy sector (Heffron and McCauley 2017). Against this background and 
based on our results in Section 5, we highlight the distributional effects for consumers 
as a result of the electricity prices that they have to pay under each pricing system. 
First, if policymakers in Indonesia were to decide to introduce a nodal price system, 
they would have to consider that the resulting electricity prices may vary significantly 
for consumers at different nodes; see also Table 3 for an overview of the average 
electricity prices that consumers would have to pay at each node under the three 
pricing systems. For instance, as Table 3 illustrates, under the nodal pricing system, 
consumers located at nodes 1–7 and 9 on Sumatra would have to pay 25.83 $/MWh on 
average, while consumers located at node 8 would have to pay 29.24 $/MWh. This 
means that consumers at node 8 would have to pay a price for electricity that is 13.2% 
higher than the price that consumers at node 6 have to pay on average. Although such 
price spreads reflect the inherent logic of a nodal pricing system and lead to overall 
economic efficiency, it might be difficult for policymakers to explain the necessity of 
such price spreads to consumers. As a consequence, consumers might perceive the 
differences in electricity prices to be unfair and acceptance problems may arise. 
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Second, while the discussion in Section 6.1 demonstrated that a zonal pricing system 
yields the lowest average electricity price, and this may be favorable in terms of energy 
equity, distributive justice focuses the perspective on the different prices for consumers 
in “Sumatra” and “Java–Bali.” In fact, consumers in “Sumatra” on average only pay 
26.21 $/MWh, while consumers in “Java–Bali” pay 32.72 $/MWh. This means that 
consumers in “Java–Bali” pay 24.8% more than consumers in “Sumatra.” For 
consumers in “Java–Bali,” therefore, a uniform pricing system would actually be more 
attractive than the zonal pricing system, as they would pay a lower price. 
Third, with the uniform pricing system, we could reverse the first argument with respect 
to nodal pricing. All consumers pay the same price (i.e., 32.45 $/MWh in our case); 
therefore, at least from the consumers’ point of view, there is no reason to feel that they 
are being treated unequally. However, the overall economic efficiency of the energy 
system suffers significantly from the fact that prices incentivize inefficient investments 
on the generation side. 
Table 3: Average Electricity Prices for Consumers in Each Pricing System 
($/MWh) 
 Pricing System 
Node Nodal Zonal Uniform 
1 25.83 30.28 32.45 
2 25.83 30.28 32.45 
3 25.83 30.28 32.45 
4 25.83 30.28 32.45 
5 25.83 30.28 32.45 
6 25.83 30.28 32.45 
7 25.83 30.28 32.45 
8 29.24 30.28 32.45 
9 25.83 30.28 32.45 
“Sumatra” 26.21 30.28 32.45 
10 32.77 32.69 32.45 
11 32.69 32.69 32.45 
12 32.69 32.69 32.45 
13 32.77 32.69 32.45 
14 32.77 32.69 32.45 
15 32.69 32.69 32.45 
16 32.69 32.69 32.45 
“Java–Bali” 32.72 32.69 32.45 
Abbreviation: MWh = megawatt-hour. 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
Furthermore, we reflect that the overall results for nodal and zonal pricing (see Table 2) 
do not differ significantly. Hence, when reflecting only the zonal and uniform pricing 
systems, the electricity prices in Table 3 indicate that the difference between the zonal 
and the uniform electricity prices for “Java–Bali” is rather small. Consequently, 
regarding distributive justice, policymakers may consider whether to implement zonal 
pricing—from which consumers in “Sumatra” benefit significantly—or uniform pricing—
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To conclude, the previous examples illustrate that introducing a new electricity pricing 
system may have significant distributional implications. Clearly, some consumers 
benefit from a certain pricing system (i.e., they pay relatively low prices for electricity) 
while others may suffer (i.e., they pay relatively high prices for electricity). Past 
experience in various countries illustrates that reforms of pricing mechanisms (e.g., 
introducing a nodal, zonal, or uniform pricing system) can have various adverse effects, 
including inflicting hardship on the poor and vulnerable (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). 
In Indonesia, past subsidy reform attempts and the resulting increases in fuel prices 
have triggered widespread protests and rioting (Gunningham 2013). It is therefore 
necessary for policymakers to consider carefully the distributional impacts of 
introducing one of the three pricing systems. In particular, additional measures, such as 
compensating vulnerable households, may accompany the implementation process 
(Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). 
As we noted above, the concept of energy justice comprises four more forms of justice 
that may guide Indonesian policymakers when considering a major reform such as 
liberalization of the electricity sector. While further information is available from Heffron 
and McCauley (2017), in the following, we will briefly address the four forms of justice 
in the light of our case study. First, procedural justice emphasizes compliance with  
the law while preparing and implementing reforms. It includes ensuring that the needs 
and concerns of all stakeholders (e.g., citizens, firms, or PLN in Indonesia) are heard 
equally (Heffron and McCauley 2017). For example, it is important to prevent an 
interest group from being able to influence political decisions to its own advantage, 
which has been a major challenge for Indonesia in the past. In 2017, the domestic coal 
industry’s lobbying made the Indonesian Government reverse its plans to put a cap on 
coal production (Clark, Zucker, and Urpelainen 2020). In line with procedural justice, it 
is necessary to prevent such unilateral influence. 
Second, recognition justice emphasizes the recognition of rights for different groups  
in Indonesia (Heffron and McCauley 2017). In particular, all individuals must have  
fair representation and complete and equal political rights (Heffron, McCauley, and 
Sovacool 2015). For instance, this may entail Indonesian policymakers considering 
poor and vulnerable households in particular when choosing a certain pricing system. 
Third, restorative justice emphasizes the rectification of any injustices that the energy 
sector causes (Heffron and McCauley 2017). Such a major reform of the energy 
system as we examine in this paper offers policymakers in Indonesia the opportunity to 
correct historically grown injustices in the energy system. 
Finally, cosmopolitan justice emphasizes that the people of Indonesia consider 
themselves as citizens of the world and considers the effects of its energy policy 
beyond Indonesia and in a global context (Heffron and McCauley 2017). This means 
that the reforms of the Indonesian energy system are important not only for Indonesia 
itself but also for the rest of the world and vice versa: climate change is a global 
problem, and, if Indonesia does not succeed in reducing the emission of GHGs from its 
electricity production, other countries will also suffer from the environmental damage. 
To conclude, complementing the discussion of our results with an energy justice 
perspective on introducing a new electricity pricing system broadens the perspective 
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6.3 Policy Implications and Transition Pathway 
In this section, we summarize the general policy implications that result from the 
discussion in the previous sections. Additionally, we outline a first transition pathway 
indicating when and how policymakers in Indonesia can implement the reforms 
necessary for introducing one of the three pricing systems that this paper discusses. 
Existing research has highlighted that electricity markets remain a work in progress  
in South East Asia (Eberhard and Godinho 2017). As Section 2.2 discussed, 
policymakers in Indonesia face challenges in providing all citizens with electricity 
reliably and affordably while also increasing the share of RESs in the energy mix. What 
they need to cope with these challenges is a clear policy direction (Taghizadeh-Hesary 
and Yoshino 2019). In our paper, we have suggested and investigated a major reform 
of the Indonesian energy system, that is, the introduction of a wholesale market for 
electricity with one of three corresponding electricity pricing systems. From the results 
that Sections 5, 6.1, and 6.2 discussed, we derive the following implications for 
Indonesian policymakers. 
There is no electricity pricing system that addresses all three horns of the energy 
trilemma equally. Rather, each pricing system may support Indonesia in achieving a 
specific horn. Therefore, policymakers must first decide which horn(s) they want to 
focus on and, based on this decision, then choose the appropriate pricing system. For 
example, given that Indonesia is lagging behind in terms of reaching its RES targets for 
2025 and beyond, the uniform pricing system may be an appropriate option. If, 
however, the focus of policymakers remains on the affordability of electricity, the nodal 
pricing system might be preferable. Given our results, a zonal pricing system might be 
the right choice if policymakers aim to achieve a balance between energy sustainability 
and energy equity. 
Building on the previous sections and the above implications, in the following, we 
briefly outline a transition pathway through which Indonesia may introduce one of  
the three pricing systems and thereby ultimately move toward a more just energy 
transition. We build on Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt (2001), who considered four 
phases of transition: (1) the pre-development phase, (2) the take-off phase, (3) the 
acceleration phase, and (4) the stabilization phase. In the pre-development phase, a 
country is in a dynamic equilibrium in which the status quo does not visibly change. As 
Section 2.2 discussed in detail, Indonesia is indeed in such a pre-development phase 
with respect to liberalizing its energy system. To progress to the take-off phase  
(i.e., the process of change commences because the state of the system begins to 
shift), government and energy policymakers need to start the reform process. In our 
context, this means that policymakers take the first steps to introduce a wholesale 
market for electricity and implement one of the three pricing systems that we discussed 
throughout the paper. Based on our discussion in the previous sections, policymakers 
should first decide what their actual goal is with respect to achieving the three horns  
of the energy trilemma. Next, they may choose the corresponding and appropriate 
electricity pricing system and implement it. Exemplary steps that will be necessary 
during implementation comprise reducing the level of state control in the energy 
system, opening the market to independent and private parties, and establishing a 
power exchange with corresponding permissions. During this take-off phase, in 
particular, it is important that procedural and recognition justice are present. In the 
acceleration phase (i.e., visible structural changes take place through an accumulation 
of socio-cultural, economic, ecological, and institutional changes that reflect each 
other), it will be important for policymakers to be oriented toward set goals, for example 
in the form of milestones with exact due dates. An exemplary milestone may relate to 
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the question of when a power exchange starts its operation. Finally, the stabilization 
phase is the phase in which Indonesia will successfully liberalize its energy system  
and adequately address the energy trilemma through the newly introduced market 
mechanisms. During all of these four phases, it is particularly important that those  
who are responsible for the reform as well as the future market participants acquire 
know-how on how a liberalized wholesale market for electricity functions and how they 
can organize it efficiently. Against this background, it will be essential to build actively 
on the experience that countries around the world have gained in introducing the 
different pricing systems (see Section 2.1). 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed an electricity market reform concerning the introduction of a 
wholesale market for electricity with respect to balancing the energy trilemma. We 
developed three generic models that allow policymakers to analyze the impact of 
introducing a nodal, a zonal, or a uniform pricing system on the three horns of the 
energy trilemma in their country. We evaluated our approach using a simplified network 
representation of the Indonesian electricity system with first real-world data; in 
particular, we focused on the electricity systems of Sumatra and Java–Bali. The results 
of our evaluation indicate that none of the pricing systems is able to balance all three 
horns of the trilemma in Indonesia equally. However, we found that each of the pricing 
systems is able to foster specific horns of the energy trilemma. Among others, we 
found that a nodal pricing system maximizes welfare in Indonesia, whereas a uniform 
pricing system supports energy sustainability (i.e., an increase in RESs). Furthermore, 
our paper offered relevant implications for both research and practice. Our results 
indicate the need for a connection of the two islands of Sumatra and Java–Bali as our 
evaluation shows that, under each of the three pricing systems, it is possible to build 
corresponding transmission lines. According to our results, policymakers may first 
consider which horn of the energy trilemma they want to focus on and then implement 
the appropriate electricity pricing system in the next step. Moreover, we broadened the 
discussion of our results toward an energy justice perspective on Indonesia’s energy 
trilemma. In particular, we discussed the fact that it is always necessary to consider  
the choice of a certain electricity pricing system under its distributional effects. For 
example, we stated that policymakers may consider whether to foster RES investments 
within the whole system (i.e., the introduction of uniform pricing) or whether to 
introduce zonal pricing under which consumers in Sumatra benefit while consumers  
in Java–Bali are not significantly inferior. Based on these implications, we ultimately 
illustrated a transformation pathway that may guide (Indonesian) policymakers in 
introducing a wholesale market for electricity including one of the three pricing systems 
that we discussed in the paper. 
Although our approach is in line with the current literature, there are inherent limitations 
that we want to outline briefly here. First, the results of our evaluation are limited to the 
electricity networks of Sumatra and Java–Bali, while the general applicability of our 
developed models holds for any other country or region. Second, due to a lack of real-
world data, the data that our evaluation uses contain several assumptions, for example 
regarding exact network capacities. Third, our models are limited regarding further 
policy instruments like network fees, which they do not consider. Furthermore, we note 
that developing Indonesia’s current single-buyer model to a wholesale market model 
may entail practical challenges that we did not consider in our paper, for example 
Indonesia’s political economy. 
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Future research may focus, for example, on the integration of storage into our model, 
which may be of relevance with respect to energy security. Moreover, research may 
extend our model by considering the concept of demand side flexibility and its possible 
effects on electricity price peaks. Of course, future research may also enhance our 
data set and extend the evaluation to all the regions of Indonesia. In summary, the 
models that we developed in this paper provide a manifold foundation for research and 
practice regarding the analysis of impacts concerning the introduction of a wholesale 
market for electricity in Indonesia. In particular, our evaluation results and respective 
discussions may serve as a valuable basis for policymakers regarding the successful 
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APPENDIX 1: SETS, PARAMETERS, AND VARIABLES 
This appendix presents a summary of the main sets, parameters, and variables that we 
used in our models. 
Table 4: Sets 
Symbol Description 
𝒢𝒢 Electricity network 
𝑁𝑁 Set of network nodes 
𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁 Set of consumer nodes 
𝐿𝐿 Set of transmission lines 
𝐿𝐿ex ⊆ 𝐿𝐿 Set of existing transmission lines 
𝐿𝐿new ⊆ 𝐿𝐿 Set of candidate transmission lines 
𝑇𝑇 Set of time periods 
𝑍𝑍 Set of given price zones 
𝐺𝐺 Set of conventional generators 
𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 ⊆ 𝐺𝐺 Set of conventional generators located at node 𝒏𝒏 
𝐺𝐺ex ⊆ 𝐺𝐺 Set of existing conventional generators 
𝐺𝐺new ⊆ 𝐺𝐺 Set of new conventional generators 
𝑅𝑅 Set of renewable generators 
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 ⊆ 𝑅𝑅 Set of renewable generators located at node 𝒏𝒏 
𝑅𝑅ex ⊆ 𝑅𝑅 Set of existing renewable generators 
𝑅𝑅new ⊆ 𝑅𝑅 Set of new renewable generators 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
Table 5: Parameters 
Symbol Description Unit 
𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Intercept of demand function 𝑐𝑐 in period 𝑡𝑡 $/MWh 
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 Slope of demand function 𝑐𝑐 $/MWh
2 
𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔 Variable production cost of generator 𝑔𝑔 $/MWh 
𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 Variable production cost of generator 𝑟𝑟 $/MWh 
?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟 Maximum power output of generator 𝑟𝑟  MW 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 Maximum power output of generator 𝑔𝑔 MW 
𝑓𝑓?̅?𝑙 Transmission capacity of line 𝑙𝑙 MWh 
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 Susceptance of line 𝑙𝑙 MWh 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 Line investment cost for 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 $ 
𝑘𝑘 Number of price zones 1 
𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 Generation investment cost for 𝑔𝑔 $/MWh 
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 Generation investment cost for 𝑟𝑟 $/MWh 
Abbreviations: MWh = megawatt-hour, MWh2 = megawatt-hour squared, MW = megawatt. 
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Table 6: Variables and Derived Quantities 
Symbol Description Unit 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Electricity demand at node 𝑐𝑐 in period 𝑡𝑡 MWh 
𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 Electricity generation of generator 𝑟𝑟 in period 𝑡𝑡 MWh 
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 Electricity generation of generator 𝑔𝑔 in period 𝑡𝑡 MWh 
?̅?𝑥𝑟𝑟 Invested generation capacity of generator 𝑟𝑟 MW
 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 Invested generation capacity of generator 𝑔𝑔 MW 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 Power flow on line 𝑙𝑙 in period 𝑡𝑡 MWh 
Θ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 Phase angle value at node 𝑛𝑛 in period 𝑡𝑡 rad 
𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Line extension variable for candidate line 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 {0, 1} 
Abbreviations: MWh = megawatt-hour, MW = megawatt, rad = radiant. 
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APPENDIX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this appendix, we present more detailed information on the model inputs that  
we used. 
Table 7: Overview of Nodes (Provinces of Sumatra and Java–Bali)  




North Sumatra 2 
Riau (incl. Riau Islands) 3 
West Sumatra 4 
Jambi 5 
Bengkulu 6 
South Sumatra 7 





West Java 12 
Central Java 13 
Yogyakarta 14 
East Java 15 
Lesser Sunda Islands  
Bali 16 
Abbreviation: ID = identification number. 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
Table 8: Overview of the Existing Generation Capacities  
(MW) 
ID Coal Gas Diesel Hydro Geothermal Wind 
Solar 
PV Biomass Total 
1 220 380 96.2 – – – – – 696.2 
2 800 1,286.4 270.6 520.9 350 – – – 3,227.9 
3 249 432.2 420.58 114 – – – 0.9 1,216.68 
4 406.5 – 63.09 286.5 – – – – 756.09 
5 12 359.2 10.4 – – – – – 381.6 
6 – – 41.7 236.3 – – – – 278 
7 1,277 863.9 25 23.7 – – – – 2,189.6 
8 93 75 126.5 – – – – 11 305.5 
9 454 160 0.4 174.3 210    998.7 
10 – 3,539 – – – – – – 3,539 
11 6,201.3 740 – – – – – – 6,941.3 
12 2,700 2,452 – 1,985.5 1,198.7 – – – 8,336.2 
13 5,390 – 1,396.4 305.7 60 – – – 7,152.1 
14 – – – – – – – – – 
15 6,070 3,004.6 124.88 274.9 – – – – 9,474.38 
16 426 – – – – 0.75 0.03 – 426.78 
Total 24,298.8 13,292.3 2,575.75 3,685.3 1,818.7 0.75 0.03 11.9  
Abbreviations: MW = megawatt, ID = identification number, PV = photovoltaics. 
Source: Authors’ creation based on PT PLN (2018). 
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Coal, existing 30 34 – 26.8 
Coal, new 30 42 1,525 22.1 
Gas, existing 25 34 – 69.7 
Gas, new 25 56 825 45.3 
Diesel 25 46 800 325.5 
Large hydro 25 – 1,953b 0.55 
Small hydro 25 – 3,100 0.55 
Geothermal 30 – 4,550 0.25 
Wind 25 – 1,750 – 
Solar PV 25 – 950 – 
Biomass 25 – 1,750 3 
a Variable cost includes variable operation cost and fuel cost. 
b In line with similar assumptions (e.g., in Handayani, Krozer, and Filatova 2017), investment costs for large hydro are 
estimated at 63% of those of small hydro.  
Abbreviations: kW = kilowatt, MWh = megawatt-hour. 
Source: Authors’ creation based on IESR (2019b). 
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